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1. INTRODUCTION
w xIn 1952, Nash 13 first proved the existence of equilibrium for games
where the players' preferences are representable by continuous quasi-con-
w xcave utilities and the strategy sets are simplexes. Next Debreu 4 proved
the existence of equilibrium for abstract economies. Recently, the exis-
tence of Nash equilibrium was further generalized in more general settings
w xby several authors 5, 9, 10, 14]18 . In fact, they imposed weaker condi-
tions on the preference correspondences and constraint correspondences,
and they also considered the consumer's set in more general spaces, e.g., in
w xlocally convex spaces or topological Riesz spaces. In 1990, Tian 15 proved
an equilibrium existence theorem for noncompact abstract economy with a
countable number of agents; however, his feasible set is assumed to be
metrizable and the set of agents is countable. However, in recent papers
* This paper was partially supported by KOSEF in 1995]1996.
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 w x w x.e.g., Ding, Kim, and Tan 5 , and Kim 9 , the underlying spaces are not
p  .compact or metrizable, e.g., the choice set lies in l or H 0 - p - 1 ,p
and the set of agents is uncountable.
In this paper, we shall first prove a new equilibrium existence theorem
for noncompact generalized games with an uncountable number of agents
with general preference correspondences which do not have open lower
sections. We also give an example that the previous results due to Shafer
w x w xand Sonnenschein 14 Borglin and Keiding 3 , Yannelis and Prabhakar
w x w x18 , and Tian 15 do not work; however, our result can be applicable. Next
we give another equilibrium existence theorem for noncompact general-
ized games with an uncountable number of agents with preference corre-
spondences having open lower sections. Finally, using Dugundji's extension
theorem, we shall prove a separation theorem in compact generalized
games.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2 A the
family of all subsets of A and by cl A the closure of A in X. If A is a
subset of a vector space, we shall denote by co A the convex hull of A. If
A is a nonempty subset of a topological vector space X and S, T : A ª 2 X
Xare correspondences, then co T , cl T , co T , T l S: A ª 2 are correspon-
 . .  .  . .  .  .dences defined by co T x s co T x , cl T x s cl T x , co T x s
  ..  . .  .  .cl co T x , and T l S x s T x l S x for each x g A, respectively.
Let X, Y be nonempty topological spaces and T : X ª 2Y be a corre-
spondence. A correspondence T : X ª 2Y is said to be upper semicontinu-
 .ous if, for each x g X and each open set V in Y with T x ; V, there
 .exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that T y ; V for each
y g U; a correspondence T : X ª 2Y is said to be lower semicontinuous if,
 .for each x g X and each open set V in Y with T x l V / B, there exists
 .an open neighborhood U of x in X such that T y l V / B for each
y g U.
 .Let I be a possibly uncountable set of agents. For each i g I, let Xi
 .be a nonempty set of actions. A generalized game or an abstract economy
 .G s X , A , B , P is defined as a family of ordered quadruplesi i i i ig I
 . X , A , B , P , where X is a nonempty topological vector space a choicei i i i i
. X iset , A , B :  X ª 2 are constraint correspondences, and P :i i jg I j i
 X ª 2 X i is a preference correspondence. An equilibrium for G is ajg I j
 .  .point x g X s  X such that, for each i g I, x g cl B x and P xÃ Ã Ã Ãig I i i i i
 .l A x s B. Actually, an equilibrium point is both a fixed point of theÃi
correspondence cl B and a separation point of the correspondences Pi i
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and A . When A s B for each i g I, or definitions of an abstracti i i
 .economy or generalized game and an equilibrium coincide with the
w xstandard definitions, e.g., in Borglin and Keiding 3, p. 315 or in Yannelis
w xand Prabhakar 18, p. 242 .
3. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM AND SEPARATION
First we prove a new equilibrium existence theorem for a noncompact
nonmetizable generalized game with preference correspondences which do
not have open lower sections. For simplicity, we may assume A s B fori i
each i g I.
 .THEOREM 1. Let G s X , A , P be a generalized game where I is ai i i ig I
 .possibly uncountable set of agents such that for each i g I,
 .1 X is a nonempty con¨ex subset of a locally con¨ex Hausdorffi
topological ¨ector space and D is a nonempty compact subset of X ,i i
 . D i2 the correspondence cl A : X ª 2 is upper semicontinuous suchi
 .that A x is nonempty con¨ex for each x g X s  X ,i ig I i
 . X i3 the correspondence cl P : X ª 2 is upper semicontinuous suchi
 .  .that P x is possibly empty con¨ex for each x g X,i
 .   . . 4  .4 the set W [ x g X : A l P x / B is possibly empty closed,i i i
 .  .5 for each x g W , x f cl P x .i i i
 .Then G has an equilibrium choice x g X, i.e., for each i g I, x g cl A xÃ Ã Ãi i
 .  .and A x l P x s B.Ã Ãi i
 .Proof. If W s B for all i g I, then, by assumption 2 and Lemma 3 ofi
w x w xFan 7 , we can apply Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem 8 to the corre-
spondence  cl A and hence there exists a point x g X such thatÃig I i
 .  .  .  .x g  cl A x , i.e., for each i g I, x g cl A x and A x l P x sÃ Ã Ã Ã Ã Ãig I i i i i i
B. Therefore we are done.
w xNote that, by Theorem 3.1.8 in 1 , the correspondence cl A l cl P isi i
also upper semicontinuous. Suppose that I is a maximal nonempty subseto
of I such that W / B for every i g I . Then, for each i g I , we cani o o
define a correspondence f : X ª 2 D i byi
cl A x , if x f W , .i i
f x s .i  cl A l cl P x , if x g W . .  .i i i
 .Then each f x is a nonempty closed convex subset of D . We shalli i
show that f is upper semicontinuous. Let V be any open subset of Di i
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 .containing f x . Then we havei
U s x g X : f x ; V 4 .i
s x g W : f x ; V j x g X _W : f x ; V 4  4 .  .i i i i
s x g W : cl A l cl P x ; V j x g X _W : cl A x ; V 4  4 .  .  .i i i i i
s x g X : cl A l cl P x ; V j x g X _W : cl A x ; V . 4  4 .  .  .i i i i
Since X _W is open and cl A l cl P is upper semicontinuous, U is openi i i
and hence f is also upper semicontinuous.i
Finally, we define C: X ª 2 D, where D s  D , byig I i
C x [  c x , for each x g X , .  .ig I i
where
f , if i g I ,i o
c si  cl A , if i f I .i o
 .Then each C x is a nonempty closed convex subset of a compact set D
w xand C is upper semicontinuous by Lemma 3 of Fan 7 . Therefore, by
w xapplying Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem 8 , there exists a point x g XÃ
 .  .  .such that x g C x , i.e., for each i g I, x g c x . For i g I , x g c xÃ Ã Ã Ã Ã Ãi i o i i
 .s f x . If x g W , thenÃ Ãi i
x g c x s cl A l P x ; cl P x , .  .  .  .Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i
which is a contradiction. Therefore, for each i g I , x f W , i.e., x gÃ Ão i i
 .  .  .  .c x s cl A x and A x l P x s B. Next, if i f I , then W s B andÃ Ã Ã Ãi i i i o i
 .  .  .  .c s cl A . Therefore x g c x s cl A x and A x l P x s B. ThisÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i i i
completes the proof.
 .Remark. In assumption 4 , W must be a proper subset of X. In fact, ifi
W s X, then, by applying Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem toi
 .  . . cl A l cl P , we can get a fixed point x g  cl A l cl P xÃ Ãig I i i ig I i i
 .  .;  cl P x , which contradicts assumption 5 .Ãig I i
 .When P x s B for each i g I and x g X, we can obtain the followingi
generalization of Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem as a consequence.
 .COROLLARY. Let I be a possibly uncountable index set. For each i g I,
let X be a nonempty con¨ex subset of a locally con¨ex Hausdorff topologicali
¨ector space, let D be a nonempty compact subset of X , and let A :i i i
X s  X ª 2 D i be upper semicontinuous such that, for each x g X,ig I i
 .A x is a nonempty con¨ex subset of D . Then there exists a point x g X suchÃi i
 .that, for each i g I, x g cl A x .Ã Ãi i
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 .Proof. By letting P x s B for each x g X and i g I, all hypothesesi
of Theorem 1 are automatically satisfied. Therefore we obtain the conclu-
sion.
Now we give an example of a noncompact generalized game with
countable agents, where Theorem 1 is applicable but the previous results
w x w xin Shafer and Sonnenschein 14 , Borglin and Keiding 3 , Yannelis and
w x w xPrabhakar 18 , and Tian 15 are not applicable:
w .EXAMPLE 1. For each n g N, let X s 0, ` be the noncompactn
choice set and let the preference correspondence P and the constraintn
correspondence A be defined as follows:n
0, 1 y x q 1r n q 1 , if x g 0, 1 q 1r n q 1 , .  . .
A x [ .n   40 , if x g 1 q 1r n q 1 , ` , . .
¡ 1 y 2r3n x y 2 q 2, 2 , if x g 0, 2 , .  . ..
~w x2, 8r3 , if x s 2,P x [ .n ¢ x q 2r 1 q x , if x g 2, ` . 4 .  .
 .Then the generalized game X , A , P satisfies all of the assump-n n n ng N
w  2 .xtions of Theorem 1; in fact, the set W s 0, 1r2 y 3r 6n q 4n y 2 isn
w xclosed and the image of A is contained in a compact set D s 0, 2 .n
Therefore, by Theorem 1, we can obtain an equilibrium point x s 1r2 g XÃ
 .  .  .such that, for every n g N, x g cl A x and A x l P x s B. HereÃ Ã Ã Ãn n n
w xwe note that Theorem 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar 18 , the theorem in
w x w xShafer and Sonnenschein 14 , Theorem 2 in Tian 15 , or Theorem 3 in
w xTulcea 17 cannot be applied in this setting since the correspondences A ,n
P , and A l P do not have the open lower sections. Therefore our resultn n n
is a new equilibrium existence theorem. When n tends to infinity, we let
w x0, 1 y x , if x g 0, 1 ,.
A [ lim A sn   40 , if x g 1, ` ,nª` .
¡ x , 2 , if x g 0, 2 ,. .
~ 2, 8r3 , if x s 2,.P [ lim P sn
nª` ¢ x q 2r 1 q x , if x g 2, ` . 4 .  .
  . . 4 w xIn this case, the set W s x g X : A l P x / B s 0, 1r2 is closed
 .   .but assumption 5 does not hold. Note that the irreflexivity condition 5
.holds in the set W . Therefore there cannot exist an equilibrium for then
 .game X, A, P .
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 .Instead of the upper semicontinuity of P and condition 4 , by assumingi
the open lower section property of A l P , which is stronger than thei i
lower semicontinuity assumption of A l P , and the paracompactnessi i
condition, we can obtain the following slightly generalized form of Theo-
w xrem 4 in 5 . For completeness, we shall give a proof.
 .THEOREM 2. Let G s X , A , P be a generalized game where I is ai i i ig I
 .possibly uncountable set of agents such that, for each i g I,
 .1 X is a nonempty con¨ex subset of a locally con¨ex Hausdorffi
topological ¨ector space and D is a nonempty compact subset of X ,i i
 .  .2 for each x g X s  X , A x is a nonempty con¨ex subset ofig I i i
D ,i
 . D i3 the correspondence cl A : X ª 2 is upper semicontinuous,i
 .  .y1 .4 for each y g D , A l P y is open in X,i i
 .  .5 for each x g X, x f co P x ,i i
 .   . . 46 the set W [ x g X : A l P x / B is paracompact.i i i
Then G has an equilibrium.
 .Proof. If W s B for all i g I, then by assumption 3 and Lemma 3 ofi
w x w xFan 7 , we can apply Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem 8 to the corre-
spondence  cl A , and there exists a point x g X such that x gÃ Ãig I i
 .  .  .  . cl A x . Hence, for each i g I, x g cl A x and A x l P x sÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãig I i i i i i
B. Therefore we are done.
Suppose that I is a maximal nonempty subset of I such that W / Bo i
w xfor every i g I . Then, for each i g I , by applying Lemma 5.1 in 18 , theo o
 . D icorrespondence co A l P : W ª 2 satisfies all of the assumptions ofi i i
w xTheorem 3.2 in 18 , and hence there exists a continuous selection f ofi
 .  . co A l P , i.e., f : W ª D is a continuous map such that f x g co Ai i i i i i i
. . D il P x for each x g W . Define a correspondence f : X ª 2 byi i i
f x , if x g W , 4 .i i
f x s .i  cl A x , if x f W . .i i
 .Then, for each x g X, f x is a nonempty closed convex subset of D . Toi i
show f is upper semicontinuous, we must show that the set U [ x g X :i
 . 4  .f x ; V is open in X for every open subset V of D . Since f x gi i i
 .cl A x for each x g W , we havei i
U s x g W : f x ; V j x g X _W : f x ; V 4  4 .  .i i i i
s x g W : f x g V j x g X : cl A x ; V . 4  4 .  .i i i
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 .Note that, by assumption 4 , the set W is open. Since cl A is upperi i
semicontinuous and f is continuous, U is open in X, and hence f isi i
upper semicontinuous.
Finally, we define C: X ª 2 D, where D s  D , byig I i
C x [  c x , for each x g X , .  .ig I i
where
f , if i g I ,i o
c si  cl A , if i f I .i o
 .Then each C x is a nonempty closed convex subset of a compact set D
w xand C is upper semicontinuous by Lemma 3 of Fan 7 . Therefore, by
w xapplying Himmelberg's fixed-point theorem 8 , there exists a point x g XÃ
 .  .  .such that x g C x , i.e., for each i g I, x g c x . For i g I , x g c xÃ Ã Ã Ã Ã Ãi i o i i
 .s f x . If x g W , thenÃ Ãi i
x s f x g co A l P x ; co P x , .  .  .  .Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i
which is a contradiction. Therefore, for each i g I , x f W , i.e., x gÃ Ão i i
 .  .  .  .c x s cl A x and A x l P x s B. Next, if i f I , then W s B andÃ Ã Ã Ãi i i i o i
 .  .  .  .c s cl A . Therefore x g c x s cl A x and A x l P x s B. ThisÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i i i i i
completes the proof.
 .  .  .Remarks. i Note that we can replace assumptions 4 and 6 as
follows without affecting the conclusion:
 X .  .y1 .4 for each y g D , co A l co P y is open,i i i
 X.   . . 46 the set W [ x g X : co A l co P x / B is paracompact.i i i
w xIn this case, Theorem 2 is a slight generalization of Theorem 4 in 5 .
 . w xii Recently, Tian 15 proved a noncompact generalization of Theo-
w xrem 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar 18 using some compact convex
 . .assumptions vii 1]3 ; however, we may assume the range of the corre-
spondence cl A is contained in a nonempty compact subset D of X fori i i
 .each i g I and the paracompactness condition 6 .
When the commodity space X is compact convex for each i g I, we cani
w xobtain a generalization of Theorem 6.1 in Yannelis and Prabhakar 18 as
a corollary.
Now we give a simple example of a noncompact one-person game where
Theorem 2 is applicable but Theorem 1 is not applicable.
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w .EXAMPLE 2. Let X s 0, ` be the noncompact choice set and let the
correspondences A, P: X ª 2 X be defined as follows:
0, 2 , if x g 0, 2 ,. .
A x [ .  w x0, 2 , if x g 2, ` ,.
2¡ w xx , x q , if x g 0, 2 , /1 q x~P x [ . 2
x q , if x g 2, ` . .¢ 51 q x
Then all of the hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied; in fact, the set
w .W s 0, 2 is open, and hence paracompact. Therefore, by Theorem 2, we
 .  .can obtain an equilibrium point 2 g X such that 2 g cl A 2 and A 2 l
 .   . . 4 w .P 2 s B. Note that the set W s x g X : A l P x / B s 0, 2 is not
closed, so that Theorem 1 is not applicable. Also Theorem 6.1 in Yannelis
w x w xand Prabhakar 18 , Theorem 2 in Tian 15 , or the theorem in Shafer and
w xSonnenschein 14 cannot be applied to this setting since the correspon-
dences A and P do not have open lower sections.
The following Michael's selection theorem is essential in proving a
separation result:
w xLEMMA 11 . Let X be a nonempty paracompact topological space, Y be a
nonempty complete metrizable locally con¨ex topological ¨ector space, and K
be a nonempty closed con¨ex subset of Y. Let T : X ª 2 K be a lower
 .semicontinuous correspondence such that each T x is nonempty closed
con¨ex. Then T has a continuous selection, i.e., there exists a continuous map
 .  .f : X ª K such that f x g T x for each x g X.
w Y xRemark. In 11, Theorem 3.2 , Y is assumed to be a Banach space.
w xHowever, as remarked in 12, p. 275 , Y can be relaxed to a complete
metrizable locally convex topological vector space.
Finally, we shall prove the following separation theorem for compact
settings.
 .THEOREM 3. Let G s X , A , P be a generalized game where I is ai i i ig I
 .possibly uncountable set of agents such that, for each i g I,
 .1 X is a nonempty compact con¨ex subset of a metrizable locallyi
con¨ex Hausdorff topological ¨ector space,
 .  .2 for each x g X s  X , A x is a nonempty con¨ex subset ofig I i i
X ,i
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 .   . . 4  .3 the set W [ x g X : A l P x / B is nonempty closed,i i i
 .4 A l P is lower semicontinuous on W ,i i i
 .  .  .5 for each x g W , either x f co P x or x f co A x .i i i i i
Then there exists a separation point x g X such that, for each i g I,Ã
A x l P x s B. .  .Ã Ãi i
w x  .Proof. By Proposition 3.5 in 11 , the correspondence co A l P :i i
W ª 2 X i is also lower semicontinuous. Since W is also compact, by thei i
previous lemma, there exists a continuous selection f : W ª X such thati i i
f x g co A l P x for each x g W . .  .  .i i i i
Since W is closed in a metrizable space X and f is continuous on W , byi i i
Äw xDugundji's extension theorem 6 , there exists a continuous extension f ofi
f on X such thati
Äf x s f x for each x g W .  .i i i
and
Äf X ; co f W ; X . .  . .i i i i
ÄNow we define f : X ª X where X s  X , byig I i
Ä Äf x [  f x for each x g X . .  .ig I i
Ä Ä .Then f is clearly continuous and each f x is nonempty. Therefore, by
Tychonoff's fixed-point theorem, there exists a point x g X such thatÃ
Ä .x s f x . For each i g I, we have either x g W or x f W . If x g W forÃ Ã Ã Ã Ãi i i
some i g I, then
Ãx s f x ; co A l P x , .  .  .Ã Ã Ãi i i i
 .which contradicts assumption 5 . Therefore, for each i g I, x f W , i.e.,Ã i
 .  .for i g I, A x l P x s B. This completes the proof.Ã Ãi i
In Theorem 3, we do not assume the upper semicontinuity of A , andi
hence we cannot obtain the fixed-point result for A .i
Finally, we obtain a fixed-point theorem of Fan]Browder type in com-
pact metrizable space as an easy consequence.
COROLLARY. Let X be a nonempty compact con¨ex subset of a metrizable
locally con¨ex Hausdorff topological ¨ector space and let A: X ª 2 X be a
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 .lower semicontinuous correspondence such that, for each x g X, A x is a
nonempty closed con¨ex subset of X. Then there exists a fixed point x g X forÃ
 .A, i.e., x g A x .Ã Ã
Proof. By letting A s P in Theorem 3, then all of the assumptions
 .  .  .except 5 are satisfied. In fact, W s X is closed. However, A x l P xi
 ./ B for each x g X ; therefore assumption 5 cannot be satisfied so that
 .  .there exists x g W such that x g co A x s A x .Ã Ã Ã Ã
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